




















!Abstract-In this study we examine the revenue expendi-
ture relationships within public and private research and doc-
toral institutions. Results suggest tight relationships between 
some revenue and expenditure categories. Instructional ex-
penditures are significantly influenced by revenues from tuition 
and fees, governmental appropriations (for public institutions), 
and grants and contracts. These results are significant both 
statistically and substantively. Research expenditures are af-
fected first and foremost by government grants and contracts, 
and this is especially true at private institutions. Revenues from 
tuition, appropriation, and private gifts have a rather moderate 
effect on research expenditure. These results are consistent 
with the resource dependency interpretation of resource alloca-
tion patterns. Although the relationships between some revenue 
and expenditure categories are tight, the categories themselves 
are very broad and defined by historical convention rather 




Innovation is a major source of national income growth 
and thus of enhanced international competitiveness.  
Economists have estimated that as much as half of the over-
all increase in gross domestic product in the United States 
since 1945 has resulted from technological innovations (Steil, 
Victor, & Nelson, 2002).  Universities are major contribu-
tors to a nation’s innovative outcomes, largely through their 
academic departments and research centers and institutes. 
Universities and their internal units derive their reve-
nues from many sources, including tuition and fees, state 
appropriations, state and federal grants and contracts, and 
endowment earnings.  Expenditure categories include in- 
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struction, research, public service, scholarships and fellow-
ships, student services, academic and institutional support, 
and operation and maintenance of the physical plant.  
These categories are considered to be “functional” expendi-
ture categories.  Observing the relationships among varia-
tions in university revenues and variations in expenditure 
patterns is important because revenue providers, e.g., the 
federal and state governments can thereby structure their 
subsidies, e.g., block grants, research grants, student aid 
subsidies, to promote particular policy outcomes.  Similarly, 
universities themselves can adjust their internal allocation 
patterns in ways that will provide internal actors with incen-
tives to promote particular outcomes.  For example, some 
functional expenditure categories connect intuitively to in-
novation.  Allocations to research (and ultimately to publi-
cation of research papers, completion of patent applications, 
and the licensing of intellectual property) and to scholarships 
and fellowships (especially for graduate students) may lead 
to scientific discoveries, establishment of economic rela-
tionships with firms, and development of new technologies.  
Allocations to instruction of course, as well as to research, 
translate into production of degrees in fields such as science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics.  Other function-
al expenditure categories make tangible but less direct con-
tributions to innovation.  Academic support for libraries 
and much of the university’s technology, and institutional 
support for administrative offices such as the VP for Re-
search and Dean of the Graduate School, contribute indi-
rectly but not insubstantially to innovation.  Consequently, 
identifying what factors predict university expenditures in 
areas such as research becomes an important policy matter.  
One means by which to conduct such an inquiry is to inves-
tigate relationships among revenue sources and functional 
expenditures.  As the saying goes, “Follow the money.” 
Several investigators have pursued this line of inquiry 
and produced useful results.  Perhaps the earliest such 
study was conducted by Hasbrouck (1997), who observed 
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that state appropriations were more likely to be used to sup-
port instruction than were state categorical grants, which 
often were used for research.  Hasbrouck’s findings dem-
onstrated that relationships between revenue sources and 
expenditures did exist and that studies focusing on these 
relationships could illuminate important facets of university 
operations.  Zhang (forthcoming) employed a similar ap-
proach to examine whether specific revenue sources contri-
buted more than others to increasing college graduation 
rates.   
In regard to innovation, such work demonstrates that 
how universities receive and spend their money does matter.  
Without a grasp of these relationships, it is difficult to know 
how university behaviors that ultimately will impact innova-
tion best can be supported.  Understanding these relation-
ships also may suggest specific external policy initiatives, 
such as how best to target or broaden federal research fund-
ing and how best to increase the scientific labors force that 
can be expected to foster innovation. 
This paper expands understanding of higher educa-
tion’s contribution to innovation in several important ways.  
First, whereas Hasbrouck (1997) utilized data from decades 
ago, we extended the analysis to most recent years so that 
the changes in revenue/expenditure relationships could be 
updated and observed over a longer period of time.  Second, 
we employed more dynamic models (e.g., panel data analy-
sis) to examine not only how institutions responded to 
changes in revenues, but also how responses within institu-
tions changed over time.  The latter has more straightfor-
ward and important policy implications.  Third, we focused 
on public and private research and doctoral universities ra-
ther than all four year colleges and universities as did Ha-
sbrouck because we assume that research and doctoral uni-
versities play a central role in innovation.  While our ulti-
mate goal is to identify and quantify variations among in-
come sources and expenditure patterns that relate to innova-
tion-related outcomes, in this paper we test the full gamut of 
revenue and expenditure relationships as an initial step in 
identifying and quantifying the most basic reve-




Nelson (1996) offers a most insightful explanation 
about how economic development occurs.  In his analysis, 
technical advance – that is, innovation –is the “key driving 
force behind economic growth” (p. 1).  This indeed seems 
to have been the case in recent U.S. history, at least in the 
view of several analysts.  Gordon (2002) credited both the 
“golden age” boom of productivity, from 1950-1972, and the 
recent period of growth from 1995-2000 to technological 
advances.  In Gordon’s analysis the earlier period reflected 
the diffusion and application of the electric motor, internal 
combustion engine, and other inventions from the late 19th 
century.  The 1995-2000 boom in productivity resulted 
from advances in computer and information technology.  
These dynamic periods strongly suggest that cycles of eco-
nomic growth depend upon technological innovations.  
Conversely, periods of low growth coincide with limited 
technological progress; Gordon attributes the stagnant period 
1972-1995 to the “inevitable depletion of the fruits of great 
inventions” (p. 61).  In order to understand cycles of eco-
nomic growth, then, it becomes necessary to understand the 
conditions under which innovation occurs. 
Feldman (2003) argued that a single “anchor tenant” 
may attract innovative firms and skilled labor to a region.  
While an anchor tenant may be necessary to an innovative 
system, however, a single firm is not sufficient to sustain 
technical advance over time.  As illustrated by recent eco-
nomic history, a sustainably innovative climate relies upon a 
convergence of many factors.  Both Japanese and U.S. 
firms developed many new innovative technologies in the 
1990s.  Japan’s economy languished and the U.S. economy 
flourished, however, because ready supplies of liquid capital 
and a favorable regulatory environment made the United 
States far better positioned to translate innovations into eco-
nomic growth than was Japan (Steil, Victor, & Nelson, 
2002).  These historical examples suggest that a sustainable 
climate that supports innovation results from a complex in-
teraction of firms, structures, and processes, not simply from 
one or a few innovative firms (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2005; 
Nelson, 1996, 1995). 
Nelson (1995) terms this convergence of many factors 
the “co evolution” of firms, research, and policy.  The im-
portance of co evolution becomes clear when we consider 
the processes by which innovations diffuse and are applied 
across an economy.  New technologies represent sizable 
investments.  Firms take substantial risks when they invest 
heavily in research and development and assume additional 
risks when they are the first to implement new technologies.  
Technological advance therefore thrives when a series of 
actors share the burdens of research and development.  In-
novation, in other words, demands collaboration among dif-
ferent actors, including the state, if they are to be developed, 
produced, and implemented at competitive prices (Jessop, 
1993).  Constellations of innovative firms rely upon a wide 
range of external institutions, including favorable legal and 
regulatory environments, to support their work (Nelson, 
1995). 
State support often arrives through favorable regulation, 
monetary policies, and intellectual property laws.  Yet the 
high cost of developing new technologies suggests another 
vital role that states can play in fostering innovation: re-
search funding (Steil, Victor, & Nelson, 2002).  U.S. poli-
cymakers themselves implicitly recognized this role for re-
search funding in the 1990s.  In the years after the end of 
the Cold War, political rationales for federal research fund-
ing shifted toward supporting projects aimed at boosting 
“global competitiveness” rather than promoting the national 
defense or health care initiatives (Slaughter & Rhoades, 
1996). 
Universities were ideally positioned to participate in 
the policy climate that emphasized global competitiveness as 
a rational for federal research funding.  Having long insti-
tutionalized engineering and other technology-based pro-
grams as formal academic departments, American universi-
ties offered research capacity with an inherently practical 
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bent.  Further, universities had long competed for federal 
research funds, and therefore responded quickly to changing 
rationales for research funding (Nelson, 1996).  Gordon 
(2002) lists the capacities of American research universities 
to capitalize on public funding as an important contributor to 
the sharp rise in worker productivity from 1995-2000. 
Research conducted on university campuses contri-
butes to innovation and economic growth in several different 
ways.  University-based research may be immediately 
commercialized, as is the case when discoveries yield pa-
tents, licenses, and spin-off companies (Bercovitz & Feld-
man, 2005).  Academic research also offers a range of “in-
direct” benefits, as when discoveries in mathematics or 
physics are applied in fields such as chemistry and engi-
neering (Nelson, 1996).  University-based research also 
creates “knowledge spillovers,” through which firms located 
in a particular area benefit from the synergies between their 
own work and the projects undertaken by a university 
(Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Kelly, 2006; Owen-Smith & 
Powell, 2004).  We suggest total university spending on 
research activities may be the most appropriate measure 
available for the research activity of an individual university. 
However, not all universities are equally 
well-positioned to conduct research.  Owen-Smith and 
Powell’s (2004) study of the Boston biotechnology sector 
suggests that organizational structure and behavior substan-
tially affects whether an organization is well positioned to 
participate as an active node in its market network.  In oth-
er words, intra-organizational structures and policies can 
affect whether an organization participates in the arenas in 
which innovation occurs.  A study by Bercovitz, Feldman, 
Feller, and Burton (2001) emphasizes contributions that re-
search universities make to economic development via 
technology transfer.  Their results confirm the importance 
of organizational structures and processes to understanding 
the contributions that an organization makes to innovation.  
In short a study of university contributions to innovation 
must account for the intra-organizational processes that pre-
dict the desired outcome. 
One particularly useful technique by which to conduct 
such an analysis is the study of revenue sources as predictors 
of organizational behavior and effectiveness.  Such studies 
effectively emphasize intra-organizational resource alloca-
tion by asking whether the sources from which individual 
universities draw their revenues predict functional expendi-
ture categories.  Analyses of this type have consistently 
yielded valuable insights into the behavior of universities.  
Hasbrouck’s (1997) study uses cross-sectional regression 
techniques to analyze financial data from 175 public univer-
sities.  Her study demonstrates a consistently positive rela-
tionship between state appropriations and expenses for in-
struction.  Ryan’s (2004) more recent study also demon-
strates that institutional expenditure patterns proved signifi-
cant predictors of graduation rates.  In Ryan’s account, 
universities that devote higher proportions of their resources 
to instructional expenditures generally evidence higher 
graduation rates than do their peers.  These studies suggest 
that the analysis of intra-organizational resource allocation 
provides a valid window through which to study universi-
ties’ performance and behavior. 
While instructive, the two studies cited above face a 
substantial limitation.  Both Hasbrouck (1997) and Ryan 
(2004) conducted only cross-sectional analyses (i.e., they 
examined data at one or more fixed points in time).  Do 
analyses conducted over time yield different estimates of 
effects than do cross-sectional studies? Indeed, Zhang’ study 
(forthcoming) draws just such a conclusion from analyzing 
the effects of institutional revenue sources on graduation 
rates.  Zhang’s paper first presents a cross-sectional analy-
sis, which suggests that a variety of institutional characteris-
tics, such as the mean SAT score of entering students and 
the institution’s tuition price, affect an institution’s six-year 
graduation rate.  However, Zhang also presents a panel 
analysis that controls for unobserved institutional effects and 
yields different estimators than the cross-sectional account.  
Zhang’s panel analysis suggests that institutional influences 
upon graduation rate may have been overstated in the 
cross-sectional model.  Zhang’s panel model instead shows 
state appropriations as a strong predictor of graduation rates.  
Zhang’s results suggest that there is great value in analyzing 
data using panel techniques that can account for the unob-
served effects of specific, internal units and/or time periods.  
Further evidencing this claim, Ehrenberg and Zhang (2005) 
used fixed effects panel analysis to demonstrate the conse-
quences of another organizational characteristic, the relative 
incidence of tenure-track faculty members on graduation 
rates. 
There is also an important conceptual reason for em-
ploying a dynamic technique such as panel analysis.  Nel-
son (1996) posits that innovation is an inherently dynamic 
and complex process.  Although Nelson himself isolates 
technological advance as the single most important determi-
nant of economic growth, he also notes that the individual 
factors in an environment that favor innovation are not easily 
distinguished from one another.  The use of a fixed effects 
panel analysis technique can control for these unobserved 
effects that are particular to an individual unit and/or time 
period.  Coefficients estimated using this technique, then, 
may be compared statistically with coefficients generated by 
other means (e.g., cross-sectional regression analysis, ran-
dom effects panel analysis) to determine which techniques 
provide more consistent estimates.  In other words, the use 
of a dynamic technique allows our analysis to consider the 
unobserved criteria that Nelson predicts such analyses will 
encounter.  The techniques also allow us to consider 
whether the results of the panel analysis prove statistically 
superior to those generated using other techniques, due to 
the greater control exercised. 
With both these prior studies and this conceptual note 
in mind, we posit that an analysis of the relationships be-
tween research expenditures and revenue sources will pro-
vide insight into universities’ roles in innovation, both di-
rectly indirectly.  Exploring the relationship will, in turn, 
deepen understanding of the organizations and networks that 
sustain innovation, the driving force of contemporary eco-
nomic development (Jessop, 1993; Nelson, 1996).  Fol-
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lowing Zhang’s (forthcoming) and Ehrenberg and Zhang’s 
(2005) lead we analyze our data using both cross-sectional 
and panel analysis techniques in order to determine which 
technique proves superior.  We now consider in more detail 
the methods by which we collected and analyzed data for 
this study. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
The main data source for our analysis is the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) administered 
by National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES).  In 
this analysis, we limit our sample to Research and Doctoral 
institutions, for a total of 273 institutions in academic year 
2007-2008: 96 Research Universities with very high re-
search activity, 103 Research Universities with high research 
activity and 74 Doctoral/Research Universities (2005 Carne-
gie Classification System).  We examine data of these in-
stitutions from academic year 1984-85 to 2007-08.  The 
number of institutions ranges from a low of 271 to a high of 
273 due to non-reporting and missing data, yielding a total 
of 6,543 observations over the 24-year period.   
Three IPEDS components, Finance, Enrollment, and 
Institutional Characteristics, are used to generate the va-
riables in this analysis.  Table 1 provides information on 
the definition of these variables and some basic descriptive 
statistics for academic year 2007-08.  The IPEDS Enroll-
ment Survey provides us with information on student 
enrollment by level and attendance status.  To standardize 
the data over time because definitions have changed, we 
compute the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) students 
at an institution by adding the number of full-time students 
and one-third of the number of part-time students. We do not 
differentiate among undergraduate, graduate, and first pro-
fessional degree students.  Using these FTE enrollments as 
 
TABLE 1 
DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, ACADEMIC YEAR 2007-08 
 
 Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
FTE Full-time students plus 1/3 part-time students 15895 16281 
Tuition Tuition revenue divided by FTE 11214 7094 
Appropriation Federal, state, and local appropriations  divided by FTE 5476 5621 
Grants  
& Contracts 
Federal, state, and local grants and contracts  
divided by FTE 9007 13275 
Gifts Private gifts divided by FTE 4068 8109 
Sales Sales of educational activities, auxiliary enterprises,  and hospitals divided by FTE 9894 22992 
Endowment  
& other Endowment and other revenues divided by FTE 2619 5949 
Instruction Instruction expenditures divided by FTE 13190 12684 
Research Research expenditures divided by FTE 7062 11981 
Public services Public services expenditures divided by FTE 1357 1967 
Academic support Academic support expenditures divided by FTE 3561 4931 
Student services Student service expenditures divided by FTE 2058 2191 
Institutional  
support Institutional support expenditures divided by FTE 4004 4073 
Scholarship Student scholarship expenditures divided by FTE 718 799 
a measure of institutional size, we construct categories of 
institutional revenues and expenditures on a per FTE basis.  
This is one of strategies that we use to control for hetero-
geneity across institutions and over years. 
The IPEDS Finance survey organizes institutional rev-
enues by sources and expenditures by function.  Revenue 
sources typically include tuition and fees; governmental 
(federal, state, and local) appropriations; governmental (fed-
eral, state, and local) grants and contracts; private gifts, 
grants, and contracts; endowment income; sales and service 
of educational activities, auxiliary enterprises, and hospitals; 
independent operations; transfers; and other sources.  Ex-
penditures include the functions of instruction, research, 
public service, academic support, student service, institu-
tional support, scholarships and fellowships, and transfers.  
Despite changes in accounting and reporting standards (e.g., 
GASB and FASB) that were adopted in mid-1990s, most of 
these revenue and expenditure categories are quite consistent 
over time.  There are several notable changes.  For exam-
ple, endowment income and transfers are no longer standard 
income categories in IPEDS’ Finance survey; instead, in-
vestment return is reported.  To accommodate this change, 
a new revenue category, “endowment and other incomes,” is 
created.  This category includes endowment, transfers, and 
other revenues in early years and investment return and other 
revenues in later years, so that the same revenue streams are 
captured over time.  Revenues from independent operations 
usually do not support the activities accounted for by educa-
tional expenditures, and these are not considered in our 
analysis.  All the revenue and expenditure categories in 
Table 1 are adjusted by student FTE to account for the dif-
ferences and changes in student enrollment across institu-
tions and over time.   
Our panel data approach estimates models in which 
each category of institutional expenditure of institution i in 
year t ( itE ) is specified to be a function of different revenue 
categories of institution i in year t ( itR ).  That is, 
 ititit RE "## $$% 10    (1)
      
For the pooled regression in equation (1) to produce 
consistent and efficient estimates, the error term it"  must 
be orthogonal with all revenue variables, and all must be 
independent from each other.  Unfortunately, these two 
conditions are not likely to hold in this situation.  Because 
institutions are observed over time, one would assume that 
error terms for the same institution over time are likely to be 
correlated with each other, thus violating the independence 
assumption.  For example, private institutions may rely 
more on tuition revenue than do public institutions and thus 
are more likely to devote a larger proportion of their reve-
nues to instructional purposes.  (In the analysis that follows, 
we conduct separate analyses for public and private institu-
tions.) Even among public (or private) institutions, different 
institutions may have different priorities in resource alloca-
tion, as their institutional missions will vary.  To take this 
unobserved institutional heterogeneity into account, we as-
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sume an error component i&  that is unique to institution i 
but does not vary over time. 
Similarly, there could be unobserved time specific fac-
tors that affect all institutions in the same period.  This time 
effect is especially important in our analysis since our data 
span a period of 24 years.  There have been year-to-year 
economic fluctuations that affect, for example, governmental 
appropriations and private gifts, which ultimately influence 
educational expenditures.  To capture this time trend, we 
assume a second error component t'  that changes over 
time but does not vary across institutions.  After building 
these two error components in equation (1), we have 
ittiitit uRE $$$$% '&## 10       (2)
   
In our empirical analyses, we use and test different 
model specifications, including pooled OLS regression in 
equation (2), fixed effects models with only institutional 
fixed effects, fixed effects models with both institutional and 
time fixed effects as in equation (2), and random effects 
models.  An F test is used to test the joint significance of 
fixed effects.  Results suggest that both institutional and 
time fixed effects are necessary.  Further, Hausman’s spe-
cification test is used to test between fixed effects and ran-
dom effects models.  Our results favor the fixed effects 
models.  We then estimate our preferred model (fixed ef-
fects model with both institutional and time fixed effects in 
this particular study) separately for public and private insti-
tutions.  Results of our analyses are reported in the follow-




Although the goal of this study is to identify the reve-
nue-expenditure relationships, our focus will be on instruc-
tional and research expenditure because they are most di-
rectly related to innovation. We would like to clarify several 
unique aspects of our analyses before getting into the results.  
First, estimates produced by fixed effects models use with-
in-institution variations over time and thus can be interpreted 
as changes. For example, let us assume that the estimated 
coefficient of grants and contacts revenues on research ex-
penditures is 0.5. This would mean that an increase of go-
vernmental grants and contracts of one dollar at an institu-
tion would lead to a half dollar increase in research expend-
itures at that institution.  This interpretation is different 
from the cross-section setting, where the same coefficient 
would be interpreted to mean that institutions with more 
grants and contracts are spending more on research, which, 
while true, might be caused by other, confounding factors.   
Second, revenues and expenditures in actual dollar 
amount are reported.  Typical production functions, such as 
Cobb-Douglas, require the logarithm transformation, and 
thus regression results can be interpreted as elasticities.  
We use both the actual dollar amount and its natural loga-
rithm form in our analyses but ultimately report the results in 
actual dollar terms.  Typical production functions assume 
decreasing marginal productivity.  That is, as an increase of 
one input occurs, the resulting marginal productivity/utility 
decreases.  Although it is possible that due to restrictions 
imposed by revenue providers (e.g., private donors may de-
signate the use of their donations) some restricted revenue 
sources may exhibit decreasing marginal utility, institutions 
can reallocate unrestricted funds across different functional 
areas.  We feel it is safe, in this particular case, to use the 
actual dollar form instead of making the logarithmic trans-
formation. 
Third, because our analysis uses approximately 270 in-
stitutions over a 24-year period, it is not surprising that many 
estimated coefficients turn out to be statistically significant; 
economic significance is more important than statistical sig-
nificance in this study.  For example, a 3-cent increase in 
research expenditure resulting from a one dollar increase in 
total sales and services could be statistically significant but 
would be considered to be economically insignificant. 
Table 2 reports the fixed effects estimates in dollar terms for 
the effect of changing revenue sources on expenditure cate-
gories at public institutions. Our dependent variables in the 
head row include (1) instruction, (2) research, (3) public 
service, (4) academic support, (5) student services), (6) in-
stitutional support, and (7) scholarship and fellowships.  
Independent variables include (1) tuition and fees, (2) ap-
propriations, (3) grants and contracts, (4) gifts, (5) sales and 
services, and (6) endowment and other revenues. 
Each coefficient in the table can be interpreted as the change 
in the expenditure of the corresponding column caused by 
one dollar change in the revenue of the corresponding row.  
For example, the coefficient 0.091 in the fourth row and 
fourth column suggests that a one dollar increase in private 




ESTIMATES OF INSTITUTIONAL REVENUES ON EXPENDITURES AT PUBLIC RE-
SEARCH/DOCTORAL INSTITUTIONS (PER FTE IN $) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 










Tuition 0.429*** 0.097*** -0.079*** 0.099*** 0.081*** 0.104*** 0.146***
 (0.033) (0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
        
Appropriations 0.323*** 0.104*** 0.061*** 0.085*** 0.041*** 0.116*** 0.025***
 (0.018) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
       
Grants & Con-
tracts 
0.278*** 0.447*** 0.066*** 0.076*** 0.015*** 0.027*** 0.030***
 (0.019) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
        
Gifts 0.175*** 0.317*** 0.137*** 0.091*** 0.023*** 0.067*** 0.021* 
 (0.040) (0.015) (0.013) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010)
        
Sales 0.027** 0.028*** 0.041*** -0.003 -0.004**
* 
0.005* -0.006*
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
        
Endowment & 
other 
0.012 0.069*** 0.147*** 0.017*** -0.005 0.006 0.012* 
 (0.023) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 3982 3982 3982 3982 3982 3982 3982 
R2 0.300 0.771 0.302 0.458 0.442 0.394 0.474 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The first column (instruction) of Table 2 suggests that 
revenues from tuition, appropriations, and grants and con-
tracts contribute importantly to instructional expenditure.  
To be more specific, a one-dollar increase in tuition, appro-
priation, and grants and contracts increases instructional 
expenditures by 0.429, 0.323, and 0.278 dollars, respectively.  
Gifts have a moderate effect on instructional expenditures at 
0.175 whereas the remaining two income sources, namely 
sales and services and endowment and other revenues, have 
almost negligible effects on instructional expenditure.   
The second column reports the results for research ex-
penditures.  Besides governmental grants and contracts, 
which have largest impact on research expenditures at 0.447, 
private gifts, grants, and contracts also have a large effect on 
research expenditures.  On average, a one-dollar increase in 
private gifts, grants and contracts increases research expend-
itures by 0.317 dollar.  Tuition and appropriations have 
rather moderate effects on research expenditures.  On av-
erage, a one-dollar increase in these two revenue sources 
only increases research expenditures by about 10 cents each.  
The other remaining categories, sales & services and en-
dowment & others, have minimal impacts on research ex-
penditures. 
Results pertaining to the remaining 5 expenditure cat-
egories are briefly summarized as follows.  Whereas public 
services expenditures are moderately predicted by private 
gifts and endowment revenues, interestingly, tuition reve-
nues have a negative impact on public services expenditures, 
suggesting that as public institutions become more tuition 
driven, they downplay public service.  Academic support 
expenditures (e.g., libraries, instructional media) are mod-
erately predicted by revenues from tuition, appropriations, 
governmental grants and contract, and private gifts, with 
estimated effects all less than 0.1.  Not surprisingly, student 
services expenditures are at least moderately predicted by 
tuition revenues, but are influenced by other revenues only 
minimally.  Institutional support (general administration) 
expenditures are mainly from tuition and appropriation rev-
enues.  Finally, student scholarships and fellowships are 
moderately predicted by tuition revenues. 
Table 2 can also be read from the other direction.  
That is, instead of looking at how each category of expendi-
ture is affected by different revenue sources, one might be 
interested in knowing how each category of revenue is ex-
pended.  For example, for each dollar increase in tuition, 
public institutions spend almost 43 cents on instruction, 15 
cents on scholarship and fellowships, and about 10 cents on 
research, academic support, student service, and institutional 
support, respectively.  It is noteworthy that these numbers 
do not add up to one dollar.  The reason is that some ex-
penditure categories, such as operation and maintenance and 
non-educational expenditures, are excluded from our analy-
sis.  About one-third of government appropriations are used 
for instruction, with the rest spread among other functional 
areas.  Government grants and contracts are mainly used 
for research (45 cents out of one dollar) and instruction (28 
cents out of one dollar) purposes, with the rest spread among 
other functional areas.  Private gifts, grants, and contracts 
are also used mainly for educational purposes, with the larg-
est share (32 cents out of each dollar) going to research.  
The remaining two categories of revenues mainly are not for 
educational purposes.  Revenues from sales and services 
are generally used to cover the expenses of producing these 
sales and services, including for example hospitals and aux-
iliary enterprises. 
Results for private institutions are reported in Table 3.  
Although the general pattern we observe from the public 
institutions in Table 2 applies here, there are several notable 
differences.  It is noteworthy that private institutions in 
general receive little or no government appropriations, so 
this revenue category is omitted from our analysis.  The 
first noticeable difference between private and public insti-
tutions is that the former devote a relatively small proportion 
of tuition revenues (about 16 cents out of one dollar) to in-
structional purposes.  However this does not necessarily 
mean that those who pay high tuitions to attend private in-
stitutions get “ripped off”; in fact, the contrary may be true.  
Because faculty salaries compose the largest subcategory of 
instructional expenditures, a small coefficient here simply 
indicates a relatively weak association between tuition levels 
and faculty salaries at private institutions.  Other factors 
must explain the relatively high salaries in private institu-
tions.  This finding is consistent with previous studies that 
have shown that faculty salaries are not the main factor for 
rapidly rising tuitions at private institutions (Ehrenberg 
2004).  In addition, tuition revenues do not seem to affect 
research expenditures at private institutions, suggesting that 
tuition revenues are not used for research purposes at private 
institutions.  Finally, for each additional tuition dollar, pri-
vate institutions devote about 43 cents to institutional sup-
port of which library spending is the largest subcategory.  
These results suggest that private institutions devote much of 
their tuition revenues to areas that benefit their students dis-
proportionately.    
 
TABLE 3 
ESTIMATES OF INSTITUTIONAL REVENUES ON EXPENDITURES AT PRIVATE RE-
SEARCH/DOCTORAL INSTITUTIONS (PER FTE IN $) 













Tuition 0.159*** -0.003 0.002 0.094*** 0.109*** 0.432*** 0.074*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
        
Grants & 
Contracts 
0.466*** 0.794*** 0.013* 0.119*** 0.035*** 0.176*** -0.014* 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) 
        
Gifts 0.192*** 0.126*** 0.010 0.075*** 0.051*** 0.131*** -0.049***
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
        
Sales 0.033*** 0.022*** -0.006* 0.044*** 0.001 -0.006 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
        
Endowment 
& other 
-0.008 0.028*** 0.001 -0.019*** -0.003 -0.008** -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations 2558 2558 2558 2558 2558 2558 2558 
R2 0.656 0.882 0.013 0.322 0.583 0.846 0.710 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Government grants and contracts contribute to instruc-
tional expenditures significantly.  For each additional dollar 
of grants and contracts, instructional expenditures increase 
by about 47 cents.  The difference in the relationship be-
tween tuition revenues and instructional expenditures and 
between government grants and contracts and instructional 
expenditures probably reflects different faculty reward me-
chanisms at public and private institutions.  It is plausible 
that at private institutions faculty are more likely to be re-
warded for their research productivity, so that increased 
grants and contracts are tightly related to higher faculty sala-
ries, which are in turn reflected in larger instructional ex-
penditures because that is where these salaries are assigned 
under accounting standards.  The relationship between 
grants and contracts revenues and research expenditures is 
much tighter at private institutions than at public institutions.  
At private institutions, for each additional dollar of govern-
ment grants and contracts, there is an increase of almost 80 
cents increase in research expenditures.  Finally grants and 
contracts also have moderate effects on academic and insti-
tutional support expenditures.  One interesting finding is 
that for each additional dollar of government grants and 
contracts, the total impact on educational expenditures is 
more than one dollar.  This is consistent with the recent 
literature in this area, suggesting that institutions increasing-
ly are using their own resources to fund research (Ehrenberg, 
Rizzo, & Jakubson 2007; Zhang & Ehrenberg forthcoming). 
Private gifts, grants, and contracts have moderate ef-
fects on instruction, research, and institutional support.  
Each additional dollar of private gifts increases expenditures 
in these three areas by 19 cents, 13 cents, and 13 cents, re-
spectively.  Finally, similar to public institutions (Table 2), 
revenues from sales and services and from endowment and 
other sources do not seem to contribute to educational ex-
penditures in an economically significant way. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this study, we examine the revenue-expenditure re-
lationships for public and private research and doctoral uni-
versities.  Results suggest tight relationships between some 
revenue and expenditure categories.  Both statistically and 
economically, instructional expenditures are found to be 
influenced significantly by revenues from tuition and fees, 
governmental appropriations (for public institutions), and 
grants and contracts.  Research expenditures are affected 
first and foremost by government grants and contracts, espe-
cially at private institutions.  Revenues from tuition, appro-
priation, and private gifts have a rather moderate effect on 
research expenditures.  Student service, institutional sup-
port, and scholarships and fellowships are significantly re-
lated to revenues from tuition and fees.  
Given these results, the changing financing patterns in 
U.S. higher education, especially at public institutions, dur-
ing last three decades or so has had a direct impact on the 
priorities of higher education institutions.  For example, 
decreased state appropriations have meant decreased instruc-
tion and public service expenditures, in relative terms.  
While the relatively reduced state appropriations may have 
been compensated for by increased tuition revenues, the 
public service function of public institutions certainly has 
diminished.  On the other hand, increased revenues from 
grants and contracts for both public and private institutions 
imply that institutions are now engaging in research activi-
ties more aggressively than before.  This increase, of course, 
speaks to the increasing importance of universities in regard 
to innovation, nationally. 
If research is understood as the central component of 
innovation, then the policy implications may be to leave well 
enough alone.  Federal R&D research revenues for univer-
sities have increased every year since 1982, with one or two 
exceptions and currently stimulus funds are expanding fed-
eral R&D funds (Greenberg 2001, NSF 2009).  However, 
federal R&D funds for research universities have declined 
relative to other research support, particularly in relation to 
the funds universities provide from their own resources 
(NSF 2009).  This raises questions about the revenue 
sources of these funds, now approximately 20% of research 
expenditures at research universities.   
Generally, the IPEDs expenditure categories do not 
help us address these questions.  IPEDs expenditure cate-
gories are very broad and do not necessarily reflect activities 
by university personnel in a fine grained way.  For example, 
all faculty salaries are counted as instructional expenditures: 
“Instruction – A functional expense category that includes 
expenses at colleges, schools, departments, and other in-
structional divisions of the institution and expenses for de-
partmental research and public service that are not separately 
budged (IPEDS)” .  Yet we know that faculty at the 100 
research universities receiving the largest amounts of public 
and private grants and contracts for research very likely 
spend a substantial amount of their time on research.  Re-
search as a functional expenditure category is defined more 
precisely: “expenses for activities specifically organized to 
produce research outcomes and commissioned by an agency 
either external to the institution or separately budgeted by an 
organizational unit within the institution…include [ing] in-
stitutes and research centers, and individual and project re-
search (IPEDS).” The operative definition of research seems 
to be externally funded and/or “separately budgeted.” Pre-
sumably, the normal load of a faculty member at a research 
university, (conventionally understood as 40% research, 
40% teaching, 20% service) is captured as “departmental 
research” under the instructional category, while only spon-
sored or separately budgeted research is captured in the re-
search category.  Centers and institutes introduce more 
complexity, since some are separately budgeted and others 
are not, and frequently faculty have simultaneous appoint-
ments in departments, centers and institutions.  Overall, 
accounting conventions probably underestimate university 
expenditures on research...         
The lack of fine-grained categories means that we are 
unable to look in a nuanced way at how research universities 
spend their revenues to contribute to the “co evolution” of 
research, technology, patents, know-how, and firms.  It is 
possible that more refined expenditure categories would 
allow us to surmise intra-organizational structures that affect 
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whether a research university participates in innovation.  
While we analyzed the IPEDS data using panel techniques 
that can account for the unobserved effects of specific units 
and/or time periods, the very broad functional expenditure 
categories may cause us to miss the intra-organizational 
structures that would contribute to our understanding of in-
novation.  For example, universities may have developed 
unobserved effects stemming from reconcentration of in-
structional expenditures on research that contribute to inno-
vation.  Since these funds may be used in a discretionary 
way, they could be rapidly deployed as to target research 
likely to create technology that could contribute quickly to 
innovation.  Rather than “ripping off” students by spending 
funds on research, universities may be expending revenues 
in new and creative ways to contribute to technology that 
leads to innovation and economic growth.  In other words, 
universities’ expenditure strategies may be building a growth 
economy critical to creating high skill, high salary jobs for 
their graduates.   
While our study explicates the revenue-expenditure re-
lationship, future studies will focus on more tangible out-
comes.  We will examine degree production in relations to 
revenue and expenditure patterns in much greater detail, as 
referenced in the introduction.  For example, how does 
degree production vary across fields that are important to 
innovation, as revenue and expenditure patterns are varied? 
And to what degree does research production, as measured 
for example by publications, patents, licenses, and startups 
vary with revenue and expenditure variations over time? 
What role do centers and institutes play in this mix? Do re-
sults change if we consider only the top 100 recipients of 
public and private research grants and contracts? 
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